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Introduction
Amongst the many social factors that impact upon children, race is arguably one of the largest. 
Race is an ever-present social category that governs many elements of a child’s interaction with 
others, and especially for racial minority children it exerts a deep influence on their under-
standing of themselves. In this chapter, we shall begin by examining what the concept of race 
really amounts to, emphasizing its status as a socially constructed concept, before examining 
in the following section how children first come to recognize the existence of race, and to 
understand their own racial identity. We will then look at two important areas that illustrate 
the profound impact that the social presence of race and the child’s developing understanding 
of racial identity have upon the social conditions of many children. First, we will examine how 
race and childhood intersect in matters of educational opportunity and achievement, before 
moving on to examine the issue of transracial adoption in the final section. One final point 
is also worth making here, at the outset – although there is a complex interplay between race, 
lower socio-economic status, and its impact upon children of racialized groups, we shall not 
address such connections in this paper. There are two reasons for this: first, the interplay between 
race and poverty is complex and needs separate treatment, not least because the prejudices that 
create conditions of poverty for racial minorities are the same prejudices that generate many 
of the negative outcomes faced by racial minorities. Poor social outcomes for racial minorities 
aren’t simply explained away by poverty when the conditions that create that poverty are them-
selves a consequence of deep racial prejudice. Second, much contemporary social and political 
research on race and childhood recognizes that even if we do treat poverty as though it were 
an easily separable term of analysis from race, it still does not explain the many differences 
in outcome that accrue to children of difference races (for a good recent example, see Quinn 
2015).
The ontology of race
Understanding the ontology of race helps us to understand the interaction between childhood 






the concept of race has any reality at all, it is constructed from and constituted by our social and 
political practices. In short, race is not biological; it is social and political.
The biological emptiness of race is best illustrated by noting that our ordinary “folk” concept 
of race is not reducible to any viable nearby concept in the biological sciences. Our ordinary 
talk and practice with racial concepts seems to suggest that races are demarcated as groups of 
people with particular bodily markers, such as shared skin color, that are inherited from par-
ents, and which are ultimately tied to ancestral origins – in particular, geographic regions. For 
example, we describe a race of people as “black” because they ordinarily exhibit such physical 
characteristics as dark skin, broad noses, coarse hair, etc., which are taken to be inherited from 
their parents, and assumed to be manifest in virtue of a recent ancestral origin in Africa. Such 
considerations are often taken to give us five racial groups – black, white, Amerindian, Asian, 
and Oceanic/Melanesian – although we might be inclined to identify one or two more distinct 
racial groups amongst this. However, this “folk” division of human populations into races is 
simply not underpinned by any corresponding scientific concept.
Consider, for example, the notion of sub-species; arguably the best scientific candidate for 
explaining races. In so far as the biological sciences treat the concept of sub-species as a legit-
imate category, the standard threshold for dividing two populations of the same species into 
different sub-special groups is that at least 25% of the genetic difference between two members 
of this larger species-group be due to their membership of different population sub-groups. 
However, any two human beings are 99.8% genetically similar and of the 0.2% genetic differ-
ence that exists between them, only 4–7% is due to their membership of different population 
sub-groups – significantly short of the threshold for sub-special difference. Whatever human 
races may purport to be, they simply cannot be sub-species. Indeed, from the point of view of 
scientists, there is no viable biological category that they could be (see Atkin 2017).
Despite its biological emptiness, race is still real in a very crucial sense. The social outcomes 
and lived experiences for individuals can vary quite starkly depending on their race. For exam-
ple, Indigenous Australian children are three times more likely to die before the age of five than 
their white counterparts, and the biological emptiness of race does nothing to defang such stark 
racial differences as these. Which raises an important question: if the division of humans into 
racial groups is not supported by scientific evidence, what is it that makes race real? The short 
answer is that races and racial categories are socially constructed.
Describing race as socially constructed is simply to make the claim that our social practices 
are constitutive or, in some sense, reality-conferring for that concept: it is we who make race 
real. Socially constructed concepts are common, and despite debate about how far social facts 
confer reality upon a concept, there are straightforward examples. Consider, for instance, money. 
Money is not a natural feature of the world and depends upon the social practice of representing 
economic value and managing the exchange of this value for goods and services. Of course, the 
physical tokens we use to denote monetary value have physical properties, but none of these 
things are crucial to the concept – we might choose to use cowry shells instead of metal coins 
and polymer notes, for instance. Race is similar in so far as it is not a natural feature of the world 
even if we make use of certain natural features in its construction – we often pin race to such 
bodily markers as skin color, which we can explain in naturalistic terms, but importantly, we 
need not pin racial concepts to those particular bodily markers. Instead, what matters are the 
series of practices and behaviors that designate races, and which we use and abide by in many of 
our social endeavors. Reliance on social facts does not make race any less real, and the impact of 
race is clearly felt and certainly measurable. Indeed, the interaction of race and childhood is one 
area of the social world where the impact of race is most keenly felt and frequently measured.
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Children’s understanding of race
Children, like anyone else, are assigned racial identities and so develop an understanding of the 
racial contexts in which they are raised. The importance of this interaction emerges in two dif-
ferent aspects of the child’s understanding of race. First, how do children develop an understand-
ing that race exists? This is simply to examine how the social and psychological developmental 
of racial concepts in childhood leads children to understand their social world. And second, how 
do children come to understand the significance of their own racial identities? This question 
tends to raise issues about how children come to understand and recognize racial prejudice. We 
shall examine these two questions separately.
Children’s conception of race
A common belief is that children lack the concept of race, and only become attuned to its exist-
ence later in childhood when adults begin to impose the social construction of racial difference 
upon them. Evidence from developmental psychology, however, suggests that children develop 
a concept of race startlingly early. By analyzing the time spent looking at pictures of adult faces, 
researchers found that children from three months old show a preference for faces of their own 
race (Kelly et al. 2005). This race-aware behavior in infants ordinarily develops rapidly, and by 
ages three and beyond, most children have an increasingly sophisticated understanding of racial 
concepts.
Young children, regardless of their own race, are able to identify themselves in racial terms. 
For instance, a landmark study using black and white dolls with black children aged three to 
seven (Clark and Clark 1947), showed the majority had the ability to self-identify with the 
dolls by racial category. Later studies on white children of the same age showed parallel results 
(Goodman 1952). Despite these similarities though, there were differences between the ratios 
of black and white children identifying with dolls of their own race: around two-thirds of the 
black children identified themselves with dolls that matched their own race compared to around 
95% of the white children. Indeed, black three-year-olds were much more likely to identify with 
the white doll, and only tended to show high accuracy rates when they reached seven years old.
Overall then, race awareness develops in early infancy, and by ages three to five children show 
a clear understanding of racial categories. Indeed, evidence suggests that those children are also 
beginning to use their understanding of race to explain differences in the behaviors of others 
(Aboud 1988). In short, children understand that their social world contains racial categories 
from much earlier than many people suspect. Whilst there is some speculation about the role 
that social exposure plays in the acquisition of race concepts, there are related issues of how 
parents might best navigate the topic of race with their children. Recent research suggests that 
white parents are especially reluctant to address questions of race with their preschool children 
(Pahlke et al. 2012) and that attempts to preserve “racial innocence” are misguided – pre-school 
children not only display racial attitudes, but parental attitudes have little bearing on the racial 
attitudes of their child. Indeed, if the developmental literature is correct about the ages at which 
children become aware of race and begin to express racial preferences, the commonly expressed 
hope of preventing racial problems by “color-blind” parenting is naive and largely ineffectual.
Race, prejudice, and identity
As children develop an awareness of race they become increasingly aware of how that leads to 
differential treatment. It is clear that people of different races experience differential treatment, 
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and, in particular, that minority racial groups are often treated poorly. Moreover, children from 
racial minorities are not exempted from poor treatment or negative perceptions in virtue of 
being children. We know, for instance, that the time taken to administer pain relief to black 
children reporting to emergency departments is greater than for their white counterparts; it 
seems that black children are perceived to be less susceptible to pain (Zempsky et al. 2011). Sim-
ilarly, black children from as young as five are perceived to be more like adults than their white 
counterparts, and are more likely to receive inappropriate treatment from adults in authority 
as a result (Goff et al. 2014). The usual assumptions of childhood innocence, or need for adult 
protection, fall way much more readily for black children and lead to harsher treatment in 
schools, in health care, in law enforcement, and even contributes to earlier sexualized treatment. 
Unsurprisingly, young children show awareness of racial discrimination, and by the age of ten 
are aware that racial stereotypes often inform negative racial interactions (McKown and Wein-
stein 2003). Further research suggests that the more children become aware of racial stereotypes, 
the more likely they are to view negative interactions as racial discrimination (Brown and Bigler 
2005). A white teacher’s negative judgment about a black child’s behavior, for example, is much 
more likely to be perceived as discriminatory by those children who are aware that others rely 
on racial stereotypes to form beliefs.
Children’s awareness of race and racial discrimination, then, poses interesting questions about 
how race impacts upon the child’s developing sense of identity. As we noted, black and white 
doll studies suggest that by school-age children do use racial categories to self-identify (Clark 
and Clark 1947). However, a corresponding awareness of discrimination can be seen as having 
negative impacts upon black children and their sense of identity. For example, when asked to 
explain their preference for particular dolls, those black children who expressed a preference 
for white dolls gave such reasons for not selecting the black doll as “because it looks like a 
negro” and “it looks bad all over,” and such reasons for selecting the white doll as, “because its 
white, its pretty” (Clark 1963). These findings were generally taken to mean that young black 
children would prefer to be white and had internalized much of the racism prevalent in wider 
society. Interestingly though, there is now clear evidence that as children enter adolescence, 
this awareness of discrimination may have no real impact on self-esteem (Cross 1991), and that 
strong racial identity may boost self-esteem in the face of racial discrimination (Buckley and 
Carter 2005). In fact, awareness of racial stereotypes and discrimination may be a crucial tool 
for black children in learning to cope with racial inequalities and racist treatment – adolescents 
who do not anticipate racial discrimination tend to have higher rates of depression and stress, 
and respond more frequently with acts of violence when they do encounter racism (Caldwell 
et al. 2004).
The picture that emerges, then, is that race forms an early and important part of a child’s 
sense of identity, but especially significant for children from racialized minorities is the awareness 
that society expresses a preference for, and privileges, whiteness. Awareness of discrimination 
plays an important part in helping children of race to navigate a world that is often hostile to 
them as a result of their racial identity.
Race and education
One of the main arenas where race and childhood interact is in education, and it is here that 
many of the most troubling aspects of racism and racial inequality emerge for children of race. 
The focus in this section will be what is commonly called “the racial achievement gap” – that 
is, the fact that in mainstream education white children outperform their minority counterparts 
by significant margins in many standardized tests. In the USA, for instance, where most studies 
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of the racial achievement gap are focused, long-term trends, as measured by the National Assess-
ment of Educational Progress (NAEP), show that the average black student will score lower on 
standardized tests than 75% of his or her white counterparts (Lee 2002). Similarly, Gypsy Roma 
and Traveler (GRT) children in the UK have significantly lower rates of educational attainment 
and in many cases are unlikely to complete more than two or three years of post-primary edu-
cation (Derrington 2007).
The educational achievement gap has long been a matter of interest and concern, and argu-
ments about its underlying cause are significant because they often influence policy proposals 
for closing the gap. Arguments that racial achievement gaps are due to genetic differences in 
intelligence between races (Rushton and Jensen 2005) are often used to suggest that closing the 
gap through increased investment in educational resources for minority children is restricted 
by the natural limitations on the intelligence of those racial groups. In short, if the gap is due 
to genetics, funding social programs to close that gap is wasted money. Even setting aside any 
discussion of the problems with studies that suggest intelligence is genetic (Nisbett et al. 2012), 
we’ve already seen from our brief overview of the ontology of race that no biological explana-
tions of race will be forthcoming. If we then factor in the difficulty of simply equating IQ and 
general intelligence to educational attainment, we can then see that getting genetics, race, intel-
ligence, and educational attainment to lineup for an orderly biological explanation is a hopeless 
endeavor. Importantly though, such crass biological fatalism simply cannot be used to influence 
educational policy.
Another putative explanation for the achievement gap is that there is an oppositional cul-
ture to education amongst racialized groups. A common explanation for why GRT children 
have poor educational outcomes in the UK, for instance, is that GRT culture sees no value in 
mainstream education (O’Hanlon and Holmes 2004). Problematically, though, this explanation 
tends to lead to policy that intervenes directly in the culture of the groups themselves, or to 
claims that it is incumbent upon minority groups to solve the problems facing their children for 
themselves. Such explanations are particularly unsatisfactory in light of clear evidence that the 
attitude of minority racial groups towards education is often favorable and positive rather than 
negative (Reynolds et al. 2003). Just as with attempts to explain the gap through genetics, the 
explanation in terms of oppositional culture is inaccurate and unhelpful – there is little evidence 
that minority groups do not place a value on education.
Better explanations of the achievement gap come from examining the complex social and 
structural factors that influence the educational performance of children from racial minorities. 
There are many such factors, but the following three illustrate how social conditions influence 
the academic performance of minority children in schools.
First, as already noted, the more that children become aware that others are influenced by 
racial stereotypes, the more likely they are to see differential treatment as the result of racial 
discrimination. Studies show that teachers tend to have different responses to racialized chil-
dren: they often have lower expectations of black students compared to white students of sim-
ilar ability (McKown and Weinstein 2008). And as we have already noted, adults are likely to 
respond to black children’s behavior as though it were more adult and less “innocent” (Goff et 
al. 2014). Even setting aside the racism inherent in such differential treatment, it is unsurprising 
that racialized children respond negatively to institutional environments which they are readily 
able to interpret as discriminatory, and which feel unwelcoming or even openly hostile to their 
educational needs.
Second, the coping strategies required of racialized children remaining within education 
often challenge their racial identities. A common experience of minority children, for example, 
is that their race is incompatible with educational attainment. A perceived schism between the 
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“whiteness” of educational attainment and black American identity leads many young black 
boys to reject education in order to preserve racial identity and authenticity (Fordham and 
Ogbu 1986). Chris Derrington (2007) notes a similar pattern amongst GRT children in British 
secondary schools, along with the additional coping strategy of concealing racial identity. The 
strategy of concealment in order to reconcile educational attainment with racial identity is, as 
Derrington notes, a “maladaptive coping strategy as it roots are in denial and repression, which 
may have negative psychological consequences” (2007: 365). For many children, then, their 
racial identity has been constructed in such a way that any interface with mainstream education 
must lead to either an abandonment of racial identity, a rejection of education, or a strategy of 
concealment and lying. Importantly, we have to be clear that although these coping strategies 
suggest the rejection of education, they are not evidence of an oppositional culture. Children 
and families who are prepared to hide or even abandon their racial identities in order to retain 
access to the same education that white children have aren’t displaying an oppositional culture. 
Moreover, children and families who abandon education to preserve their racial identities aren’t 
rejecting the value of education so much as responding to the message that they are not wel-
come in the educational space. The pressures and conflicts that come from reconciling racial 
identity with the demands of educations are such that few white children will ever face them 
during their years in school.
Third, and finally, minority children must perform in an educational setting that couples 
constant assessment and benchmarking of attainment with a broader set of social signals that 
indicate to racialized children that their educational abilities are diminished by their racial iden-
tity. Now-famous research on stereotype threat by Steele and Aronson (1995) shows that when 
individuals are made aware of stereotypes about some aspect of their group identity (gender, 
race, or age for instance) they are then more likely to perform on tests in accord with those 
stereotypes. For example, black Americans outperform white Americans on a golf task when 
the task is framed as a test of “natural sporting ability,” but white Americans outperform their 
black counterparts when that same test is framed as a test of “sporting intelligence.” Interestingly, 
children are also susceptible to stereotype threat, especially as they become more aware of ste-
reotypical beliefs about their group identities (McKown and Weinstein 2003). Problematically, 
then, in an environment where minority children are subject to lower teacher expectations, 
and are sensitive to seeing differential treatment as discrimination, stereotype threat looms large. 
Children from minority groups are typically in an educational environment that contains all 
the conditions needed for them to conform to stereotype, fail, and compound the racial gap in 
educational attainment.
Having noted the role that social factors play in the racial achievement gap, it is worth con-
cluding this section with some observation on how these factors might be ameliorated. First, it 
is important for educators to talk openly about race. Just as with parenting, there is a common 
assumption that young children are unaware of race, and that color-blind teaching represents 
best practice. We know, however, that teaching children about race in early childhood is a useful 
tool for teaching all children to recognize and challenge racial inequality (Husband 2012). Sec-
ond, it is important that we pay close attention to the experience and quality of teachers that 
engage with minority children. Research by Robert Dreeben (1987) finds that given equally 
challenging and well-supported instruction, black children attain comparable reading levels to 
white children. However, in his study of over 300 Chicago first-grade students, he found that 
black students were generally less well supported and were taught by more inexperienced teach-
ers. Third and finally, we must look at the impact of testing in schools itself. As we have noted, 
minority children are susceptible to stereotype threat, and the greatest impact of this will play 
out through testing and benchmarking. It may be that testing children doesn’t merely measure 
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the attainment gap, but helps to create and preserve it (Knoester and Au 2017). If this is the case, 
then testing is itself part of the problem for children from racial minorities.
Transracial adoption
An area where race and childhood intersect in challenging ways is in matters of transracial adop-
tion – that is, where children are adopted by parents of a different race (see also ch. 19). Most 
ethical and legal questions about transracial adoption are raised in the American context where 
the adoption of black children into white families has been a common source of controversy. 
Similar concerns have been raised about the adoption of Asian, Latinx, and Native American 
children into white families, although most commentary concerns black child/white parent 
cases. In what follows we shall use the black child/white parent context in the USA as our pri-
mary source for discussion, but many of the concerns raised apply to other transracial adoptions, 
and in other contexts. So, what are the chief concerns about transracial adoption?
Arguably, transracial adoption highlights a tension in our thoughts about the kind of society 
we want our children to be raised in, and the practical realities they must deal with in terms of 
their racial identities. On the one hand, there exists both a common assumption that children 
are naive to the realities of race, and a common aspiration that we raise children in a color-blind 
manner. This suggests that when placing a child with adopted parents, racial matching should be 
a marginal consideration at most and shouldn’t trump other benefits that come from being part 
of family. On the other hand, our concern for the future well-being of adopted children means 
that we must acknowledge the benefit of learning about one’s racial identity from those with 
whom we share such identities – we may aspire to safeguard the racial innocence of children, 
but we know that they do not remain children forever, and part of their flourishing will be a 
well-supported exploration of their racial identity. This suggests that when placing a child with 
adopted parents, race ought to be a leading factor in considering what the child has to benefit 
from adoption. This simple tension leads to arguments both for and against transracial adoption.
Focusing on the needs of the child, the main argument against transracial adoption concerns 
how we are to secure the proper conditions for supporting the child’s developing sense of racial 
identity. In general terms, the argument is that racial identity is a major component in a child’s 
sense of self, but that this cannot be developed without the support of a larger same-race com-
munal group – for instance, our family. An Asian child is best placed to understand their Asian 
racial identity when raised in an Asian family, just as a black child needs a black family, and so on. 
Furthermore, children of minority races need to understand how to respond to racial prejudice 
and, again, are best placed to do this if they understand where it fits into their social identity as 
a raced individual (Caldwell et al. 2004). They are best taught this aspect of racial identity by 
individuals who share their racial identity. To deny a black child this kind of support by failing 
to consider race during adoption is, arguably, to impose a harm upon that child.
In contrast to this, arguments in favor of transracial adoption tend to contrast the practical 
constraints of obtaining race-matched adoptions with the more pressing need to secure the 
welfare of the child in a safe family environment. Racialized children in adoption systems, 
for instance, tend to remain in institutional care far longer than white children. Some reports 
suggest that in the American adoption system, as many as half of all children in foster care and 
institutional homes are black (Fogg-Davis 2002: 398). This is due, in part, to the fact that the 
majority of parents looking to adopt are white, and the practicalities of placing black children in 
black families are too restrictive. Even if we accept that race-matched adoption is preferable for 
supporting a child’s developing racial identity, it is hard to argue against claims that the benefit 
of a secure family setting is to be preferred over the potential damage of long-term institutional 
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care. If we compare the benefit to a child of transracial adoption over no adoption at all, with 
the benefits a child gains from understanding their racial identity in a same-race family context 
rather than a mixed-race context, then insisting on race-matched adoptions for minority chil-
dren looks detrimental.
A further element to the arguments for transracial adoption comes from studies that seem to 
suggest that transracial adoptions are beneficial for adopted children. Between 1972 and 1982 
Rita Simon and Howard Alstein tracked the outcomes for over 200 transracial adoptions (Simon 
and Alstein 1987) and suggested that the children in their study bonded well with their adopted 
parents, and in the long term had no problems identifying positively with their black racial 
identities. Black children adopted into white families also appear to score higher on IQ tests 
than black children in race-matched adoptions (Moore 1986), and in some studies there seems 
to be no educational achievement gap for black transracially adopted children (Raleigh and Kao 
2013). This might, at first pass, seem to suggest that there is much less need to be concerned 
about the impact on the child’s developing racial identity as many have assumed. However, there 
are reasons to approach research that suggests unequivocal support for transracial adoption with 
caution. Here we will mention just two.
First, we need to be clear that in many cases, the markers by which an adoption is deemed to 
be successful are set using “whiteness” as a normative ideal (Park and Greene 2000). For instance, 
good educational outcomes in transracial adoption tend to be judged by IQ results, and the 
outcome of test scores tend to be benchmarked by equivalence with white counterparts – is 
the transracially adopted child more like a white child with its biological family, or like a black 
child with its biological family? Similarly, research that suggests black transracial adoptees have a 
well-adjusted attitude to their own racial identity tend to rely on teacher and parent assessment, 
and simple “yes/no” or tick-box responses to questions about comfort with one’s racial category 
(Simon and Alstein 1987: 68). In many ways, this mirrors the common treatment of whiteness 
as value-neutral – whiteness is seen less as a race and more of a neutral or “normal” standpoint 
from which to judge racialized others. In terms of transracial adoption, the worry is that many 
of these measures of apparent success and adjustment are white and assimilationist.
A second related concern is that the markers of whiteness that are used to benchmark suc-
cessful adoptions are the same markers used to identify acceptable adoptive parents. It is true 
of the current system in the US that there are far more white parents in the system than there 
are black parents; however, it also seems that there has been a long history of exclusion of black 
families from the system by social workers who privilege whiteness when judging the suitability 
of potential parents (McRoy 1989). So, whilst arguments for transracial adoption look to be 
supported by social research in the area, it is worth noting that adoption systems and how we 
judge them privilege white markers of success and suitability. This makes the case for transracial 
adoption look far less clear-cut that some would have it.
To conclude this section, we will note two important things about the debate over transracial 
adoption. First, as framed here, the acceptability of transracial adoption is framed by the ques-
tion of how a child’s racial identity and development of self is supported or affected. There are, 
though, alternative ways to frame this debate. Sally Haslanger (2005) and Hawley Fogg-Davis 
(2002) both note that exactly how we think racial identity is formed might impact upon how 
we think transracial adoption supports the child’s racial sense of self. Haslanger, for instance, 
points out that we can view racial identities as “aggregate” in transracial adoptions (a kind of 
“mixed” identity) – alongside his own white experiences, the white parent of a black child 
will experience the racial features of his child’s life in ways that a white parent of a white child 
will not. As Haslanger, herself a white parent of adopted black children, notes: “I have, in an 
257
Childhood and race
important sense, been re-socialized by my kids, and although I do not share their ‘blood,’ I have 
‘inherited’ some aspects of their race” (2005: 285). This introduction of different racial experi-
ences and, by extension, the aggregating or mixing of racial identities is something that black 
children in transracial adoptions experience too – a black child with white middle-class parents 
will, in certain contexts, experience some of the social realities that come from white privilege. 
This suggests that identity formation and the developmental impact of transracial adoption is a 
complex matter, and these aggregated racial identities (for both parents and children) are best 
judged not in terms of older divisive and fixed racial binaries, but in terms of a forward-looking 
and ameliorative role in, as Haslanger puts it, “disrupting the embodiment of racial hierarchy 
and the hegemony of current racial categories” (2005: 287). We may not accept Haslanger’s view 
here, but it demonstrates the complexity of racial identity in the case of transracial adoption.
Second, it is important to acknowledge that adoption is itself part of the institutional tools of 
racial oppression, and that this makes weighing the benefits of adoption for racialized children 
a difficult matter. To take a simple example, amongst GRT groups in Europe, and Indigenous 
groups in North America and Australia, adoption has long been a state tool used to confiscate 
children from their same-race families. For many of these groups, forced adoption alongside 
forced sterilization has been used to manage the eradication of racial minorities. Similarly, for 
black Americans, the historical and structural conditions of slavery and white supremacy in 
America mean that the State has and continues to impose itself upon black families and black 
parenthood in ways that are destabilizing and demeaning (Pinderhughes 2002). It is unsurpris-
ing that many racialized parents and families are either actively excluded, or in the interests 
of their own safety self-exclude from interaction with a system that has been used to control, 
demean, and eradicate them. Simple questions about the relative benefits and deficits of transra-
cial adoption for children of racial minorities can, when contrasted against the role that adoption 
has played in structural oppression, seem misdirected. Put simply, since adoption is one of the 
many systematic tools used to the de-stabilize the racial family, to devalue broader racial kinship 
groups, and by extension leads to the disproportionate placing of racialized children into institu-
tional care, it is not enough to reduce arguments about transracial adoption to simple questions 
about whether black children do better with white parents than they do in care homes.
Conclusion
As we have seen, the social interaction of race and childhood raises important issues. Race may 
not be a scientifically robust concept, but its social construction means that children learn to rec-
ognize its existence very quickly. Indeed, they become adept at recognizing the role race plays in 
human interactions much earlier on in their childhood than many parents and teachers assume. 
What is more, understanding their own racial identity is crucial for the child’s own developed 
sense of self. This is especially so for racialized children, who experience racial prejudice and 
discrimination as a common part of their social lives and need a robust sense of social identity 
to navigate these conditions. Something else that also seems clear is that, in many respects, we 
are not sufficiently sensitive to matters of race when it comes to childhood. Race is a social 
reality, and we need to talk to and teach our children about race and racial prejudice much 
more purposefully and much more directly. We also need to pay closer attention to how race 
intersects with the lives of racialized children when we develop policies and social practices that 
impact upon children. Do our general practices of testing and benchmarking take account of 
influence that racial inequality has on testing outcomes? Is our teacher training sensitive to the 
impact of bias and teacher expectations on racialized children? Do our adoption systems show 
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proper awareness of the role that state intervention into the family plays as a longstanding tool 
of racial oppression? These are all important considerations and need much greater attention in 
our philosophical reflections on race and childhood.
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